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BARGAINING POWER AND STRATEGY IN THE
FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROCESS: A CURRENT
ANDEAN CODE ANALYSIS
Frederick M. Abbott*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Significant changes in the global economic balance of power
have taken place during the last several years. Japan and the Western European nations have made substantial progress in achieving
technological equality with the United States, 1 and many developing countries have taken or are now taking steps to improve their
bargaining position relative to the developed countries. 2
In addition, the past few decades have produced an enormous
growth in the amount of direct equity investment made by companies in countries other than their home country. 3 In order to maintain control over their domestic economies, developing country governments have come to rely on foreign investment laws, tariffs, quotas, and other means of regulating foreign economic influence. 4
In 1970, the countries of the Andean Common Market (the
Andean Pact or ANCOM), 5 adopted uniform foreign investment
* A.B. University of California at Berkeley; J.D. candidate at Yale Law School; Office
of the General Counsel, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 1975.
1. For a discussion of the Japanese and European challenge to U.S. hegemony see Hymer
& Rowthorn, Multinational Corporations and International Oligopoly: The Non-American
Challenge, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 57 (C. Kindleberger ed. 1970).
2. The success of the OPEC cartel has given new impetus to the demands of primary
product-producing developing countries for the establishment of collective and stable pricing
arrangements. See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9946 (1974).
3. The great majority of such investment has been undertaken by the so-called "multinational," "transnational," or "international enterprises." The transnational enterprise, though
difficult to define precisely, can be generally characterized as a parent corporation which
maintains a substantial amount of equity interest and/or control over a "large cluster of
corporations of various nationalities." See R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES 4-18 (1971) [hereinafter cited as VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY].
As of 1967, U.S. parent corporations were estimated to be managing about $110 billion of
overseas assets through their positions of control. Id. at 18.
4. Foreign investment laws are now in force or under consideration in nearly every
country in the world. For the investing conditions in a given country see INVESTING, LICENSING,
AND TRADING CONDITIONS ABROAD (updated monthly).
5. The Andean Common Market is made up of six nations on the western side of Latin
America: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. The legal instrument of
its establishment is the Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, commonly known as
the Treaty of Cartegena, adopted in Colombia in 1969. For text of the Treaty in English see
8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 910 (1969). For a description and discussion of the Treaty provisions,
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regulations. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, as Decision 24
of the Andean Commission 6 is called, regulates both the treatment
of foreign capital entering or within ANCOM, and related agreements on the transfer of technology, patents, licenses, and royalties.7 The member countries of ANCOM were required by Decision
24 to implement this Code as domestic legislation following its
adoption by the Andean Commission. 8
The governments of the ANCOM members were motivated by
both common and individual interests when they adopted the Andean Code. Among these were the desire to achieve a reduction in
foreign economic influence, 9 and to be able to plan more efficiently
a regional industrial structure. 10 This was to be done in a way which
including a complete bibliography of articles concerning them see Riesenfeld, Legal Systems
of Regional Economic Integration, 22 AM. J . COMP. L. 415, 436-43 (1974). The Andean Common Market is often referred to as a "subregional common market," since it exists within
the larger framework of the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), composed of eleven
Latin American nations. LAFTA was established in 1969 by the Treaty of Montevideo. Treaty
Establishing a Free Trade Area and Instituting the Latin American Free Trade Association
(Montevideo Treaty), Feb . 18, 1960, 30 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 4, at 32, U.N. Doc. E/3333,
E/CN .12/AC.45/13/Rev.1 (1960); INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES,
INSTRUMENTS RELATING TO THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF LATIN AMERICA 207 (1968). As its
name implies, the purpose of the organization is to establish a free trade zone among the
member nations. For a discussion of LAFTA see Riesenfeld at 431-36.
6. The Commission is the Supreme Organ of the Treaty of Cartegena and is instructed
per Chapter I, section A, of the Treaty to "empress its will" in the form of "Decisions." The
Andean Foreign Investment Code is one in a series of such Decisions relating to ANCOM.
For the most recent text of Decision 24 (as amended by Decision 37 of June 24, 1971, and
Decision 37-A of July 17, 1971), see 11 lNT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126 (1972).
7. Decision 24 was promulgated by the Commission pursuant to Articles 26 and 27 of
the Treaty of Cartegena. Article 27 provides, inter alia, for "a common system for treatment
of foreign capital and likewise, systems for trademarks, patents, licenses, and royalties." 8
INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 910, 917 (1969).
8. All Decisions of the Commission require subsequent internal ratification by the mem ber countries. The problems surrounding internal implementation. of the Code are discussed
in Section III of the text.
9. This desire is reflected in the Introduction of the Code which reads:
Common standards must contemplate mechanisms and procedures which are
sufficiently efficient to make possible a growing participation of national capital in
existing or future foreign enterprises in the Member Countries, in such a way as to
lead to the organization of mixed enterprises in which national capital has the majority interest and in which national interests will have the capacity to participate in
determining fashion in the basic decisions of such companies.
11 lNT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126-27 (1972).
10. Among the goals of ANCOM is to rationally allocate industrial responsibility among
the member countries through the "sectorial programs of industrial development" (SPID)
called for in Chapter 4 of the Treaty of Cartegena. The first such program has now been
established for the metalworking industry, and a similar program for the petrochemicals
industry has just been completed. See Furnish & Atkin, The Andean Group's Program for
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would give no individual member country a significant economic
advantage over the others. 11
Since the adoption of the Andean Foreign Investment Code,
there have been important changes in the political and economic
situations of the member countries (for example, the quadrupling
of oil prices which has made Venezuela a new economic power in the
Western Hemisphere), and there have been several important developments in the Code's local implementation. This Article is designed to apprise the practitioner concerned with Latin America of
progress in the implementation of the Andean Code and related
regulations in the six ANCOM countries, and to discuss implications for the investment lawyer. It examines the progress of the
Andean Pact's efforts in the field of foreign investment regulation
in terms of bargaining theories previously used solely by economists,
political scientists, and military strategists, but which have recently
begun to receive attention from international lawyers. 12 It is the
premise of this Article that both international lawyers and government officials should begin to see the forces which influence the
foreign investment process in a general theoretical framework in
order to fully understand and perhaps better control these forces.
II. BARGAINING THEORY AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A DYNAMIC PROCESS

A.

The Changing Economic Power Relationship

1.

As

DEFINED BY ECONOMISTS

Bargaining theory is an analytical framework developed to describe the process of continuous negotiation which characterizes the
relationship between foreign direct investors and host governments
in developing countries. The bargaining theory discussed by international economists such as Raymond Vernon 13 and Charles KindleIndustrial Development of the Metalworking Sector: Integration with Due and Deliberate
SPID, 7 LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS 29 (1975); Ancom Approves Petrochemical Program; Auto
Allocations Set, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, Sept. 17, 1975, at 297.
11. The obvious intention of the drafters was to insure that no single member country
would be tempted to offer investment terms more lenient than a certain minimum standard
so that competition for foreign investment could not ensue.
12. For a discussion of the possible use of bargaining theory to anticipate expropriation
see generally Anaconda Company and Chile Copper Company-Overseas Private Investment
Corporation: Arbitration of Dispute Involving U.S. Investment Guaranty Program, 14 INT'L
LEGAL MAT'Ls 1210 (1975).
13. See generally VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 3, at 26-112; Vernon, Restrictive
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berger 14 emphasizes the relative economic power at the disposal of
participants. As the economic power relationship between a foreign
direct investor and a host country government changes, the investment conditions which the investor must accept also change. This
relative economic power, reflected in bargaining strength, depends
on a variety of factors, which are discussed below.
2.

FACTORS WHICH DETERMINE THE BARGAINING POWER OF THE

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTOR

a.

Economic Resources

The great majority of foreign direct investments in both developed and developing countries are undertaken by multinational or
transnational enterprises (TNE's). There are four major economic
resources which are generally attributed to TNE's. These resources
are investment capital or access to capital, 15 technology, 16 managerial expertise, 17 and international markets. 18 The relative economic
Countries: their role in trade and development, U.N. Doc. TD/B/399 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Vernon, Restrictive Practices].
14. See generally c. KINDLEBERGER, AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 1-45 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as KINDLEBERGER, BUSINESS].
15. In developing countries, private investment capital is a critical resource. TNE's can
finance an investment project in developing countries either by using their own financial
reserves or by borrowing from financial institutions. In terms of borrowing capability, the
TNE has the advantage over the local entrepreneurs in developing countries of better credit
standing based on the TNE's proven performance and substantial equity holdings. Public
international lending institutions, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, make
loans almost exclusively for developmental projects such as water companies and other infrastructure industries, instead of to private industrial projects.
16. Technological capabilities are perhaps the most important single asset of the TNE.
The Andean Pact is focusing much of its attention on acquiring technological resources. U.S.
based TNE's, and to a lesser extent those of Japan and Western Europe, lead the world in
technological innovation. At the high end of the technology spectrum are the advanced
computer and semi-conductor industries in which the U.S. position is very strong. Technology
becomes more widely held when we proceed down the spectrum to the machine tool and softdrink industries, in which the requisite technology for establishing a plant may be obtained
from a wide variety of sources.
17. When the TNE establishes a subsidiary in a foreign country, it must also provide
trained managers to oversee operations and to coordinate the activities of the subsidiary with
the other international operations of the firm. The TNE has typically established a highly
coordinated and effective system of internal management as the result of previous experience
in other countries. As time passes, the subsidiary trains local personnel to take over the
management function so that the firm can blend into the local environment. Thus the subsidiary provides the host country with a new pool of local managerial talent. See VERNON,
SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 3, at 171, 184.
18. Access to international markets is extremely important both in the extractive and
manufacturing industries. The giant extractive industry TNE's provide a vital link between
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bargaining power which a foreign investor is able to marshal from
these resources depends upon the degree of control which it is able
to maintain over these resources and upon their importance to the
host country. If the capital, technology, management, and market
access required for an investment project are available from a wide
variety of sources, then the host country can award an investment
project to the investor who offers the most generous terms. On the
other hand, if the required technology is scarce, or if the investment
project requires a high initial infusion of capital-as in the extractive industries-then the foreign investor can demand more generous terms because the number of suppliers is limited.
b.

Motivation

If there is a compelling reason behind the TNE's decision to
invest in a particular country or region, then it will be more willing
to accept the investment terms which are offered by the host country government. If the investor's motivation is weak, that is, if the
investor is more or less indifferent as to whether the investment
should be undertaken at all, then he can demand better terms for
investing.
The motivations behind the decision to invest in an extractive
industry project may be comparatively simple. The TNE may want
to assure a supply of a natural resource, for example petroleum,
copper, or cobalt. The TNE may want both to obtain the supply at
the cheapest price-that is, from the original source-and to deny
to competitors any access to the source of supply. In addition, the
resource may be available in only a limited number of geographical
locations so that the investor does not have a variety of options from
which to choose.
In the manufacturing industries, the situation is far more complex, and numerous theories have been developed to explain the
motivations of foreign investors. Among the factors which are
thought to give rise to a manufacturing investor's decision to go
abroad are: (1) as the technology embodied in a product becomes
widely held it is necessary to move production into a foreign market
the extractive phase in the developing country and the processing and marketing phases in
the developed countries. The expenses of acquiring the shipping capabilities to transport raw
materials between countries and of building refineries and mills are enormous. In addition, a
direct link between extraction and end user provides an assured market for the resource.
Finally, in the manufacture of consumer and intermediate goods, the TNE provides an
international system of distribution and marketing. This system is essential to the exporting
producer.
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to reduce costs and effectively compete in the foreign market; 19 (2)
TNE's fear losing a foreign market to a competitor and follow their
competition into a region in order to protect themselves; 20 (3) earnings are higher in foreign markets than in domestic ones, for example, in he United States; 21 (4) TNE's try to distribute the risk of loss
either through business 22 or currency 23 fluctuations by investing in
several regions; and (5) it is the nature of the capitalist economic
system to impose itself on other systems or to risk eventual collapse.24
This suggests the number of motivation scenarios which have
been developed. Foreign direct investors approach developing countries for a variety of reasons and the factors which motivate the TNE
must be taken into account when analyzing relative bargaining
power. For example, if a TNE is seeking to establish a plant because
its competitors have already done so and it fears losing the foreign
19. The product life cycle model, developed by Raymond Vernon of the Harvard Business School is probably the most widely accepted explanation for the behavior of TNE's in
expanding abroad. Briefly, this model suggests that: (1) technological innovation occurs in
the developed countries wherein the firm which develops the technology maintains a temporary monopoly over production and distribution of the product which embodies it; (2) at this
initial point, the company faces little or no competition and can afford to produce the product
where it is developed, and export it to foreign markets; (3) as time passes, the technology
disperses (it is copied) and many producers enter the market-price competition ensues; (4)
because labor inputs are cheaper abroad and because transportation and tariff costs raise
prices in the foreign market, the producer goes abroad to lower the production cost and selling
price of the product both for local consumption and export; (5) finally, local competitors enter
the market with competitive advantages and the foreign investor introduces a new product.
See VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 3, at 65-106.
20. The oligopolistic reaction model of foreign direct investment motivation stresses the
defensive character of foreign investment and attempts to explain why TNE's follow each
other into foreign markets in closely ordered groups. Essentially, firms are taking out a form
of "risk insurance" against losing a market to their TNE competitors. For an elaborate
empirical study which supports the oligopolistic reaction model see F. KNICKERBOCKER, OLIGOPOLISTIC REACTION AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (1973).
21. TNE's have historically reported higher earnings from their overseas subsidiaries
than from their domestic operations. In 1974, return on equity of 163 companies surveyed
showed that on the average, U.S. firms obtained a domestic profitability of 11.9 percent
(down from 12.4 percent in 1973), while foreign profitability stood at 17.2 percent (down from
17.8 percent in 1973). See What Happened in 1974 to International Firms ' Profitability,
BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL, Aug. 8, 1975, at 249-50.
22. See B. COHEN, MULTINATIONAL FIRMS AND ASIAN EXPORTS 25-31, 44-54 (1975).
23. See Aliber, A Theory of Foreign Direct Investment, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION: A SYMPOSIUM (C. Kindleberger ed. 1970).
24. From Lenin onward, there have been those who suggest that TNE's are but the
capitalists' way of implanting their economic system abroad and, more or less, condemning
the poor of developing countries to lives of poverty . See V. LENIN, IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST
STAGE OF CAPITALISM: A POPULAR OUTLINE (1969); H. MAGDOFF, THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM: THE
ECONOMICS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1969); J. BARNET & R. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH (1974) .
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market to its competitors, then its bargaining strength relative to
the host country government will be weaker because it is not indifferent to whether or not an agreement is reached.
c.

Recourse ·to Law or Diplomatic Intervention
The transnational enterprise is a private party 25 bargaining
with a sovereign, the host country government. The host country
government, in its sovereign capacity, has the power to manipulate
its domestic law and thus to change its legal relationship with the
foreign investor. If the host government decides to change the terms
of an investment agreement or to expropriate the property of a
foreign investor, the foreign investor has four basic alternatives: (1)
to challenge the action in local courts; (2) to rely on international
law and to seek enforcement in arbitration, foreign or international
courts; (3) to request diplomatic intervention by its home country
government; or (4) to threaten to withdraw its investment.
While the foreign investor may be able to obtain some help from
any or all of these sources, he is nevertheless at a decided disadvantage relative to the host country government.

3.

FACTORS WHICH DETERMINE THE BARGAINING POWER OF
DEVELOPING HOST COUNTRIES

a.

Economic Resources

The economic bargaining power of a developing host country
depends on a variety of factors. Among these are: the value of a
na.ural resource(s) which the TNE is seeking to exploit; 26 the geographical location of, and access to, the country and its resource(s);27 the availability of the resource(s) from other countries
(and under what conditions); 28 the stage of the country's economic
development, that is, the structure of its capital market 29 and the
25. This of course does not hold true for state-owned enterprises.
26. Obviously, the sine qua non for bargaining with an extractive industry producer is
the possession of a mineral resource. The more scarce and necessary the resource is in world
markets, and the higher its selling price, the better is the bargaining position of the country.
Thus, cartels attempt to create conditions of artificial scarcity.
27. If a TNE faces high initial costs in developing a transportation infrastructure to
reach remote areas, it is going to demand a return which justifies its initial costs. Likewise,
countries which lack direct sea access present potentially high transportation costs.
28. A host country can make demands only to the extent that potential investors cannot
obtain the resources on better terms in other countries. Another function of the cartel is to
stop competition among suppliers by establishing uniform terms of supply.
29. A country with a well developed capital market can demand equity participation for
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income level of its inhabitants; 30 the size of its consumer market; 31
the condition of the country's labor market; 32 the investment terms
being offered by other countries (with similar resources); 33 and
whether or not foreign investors have already established operations
in its territory. 34
As a general rule, the more valuable the resources of a host
country and the greater the degree of monopoly control which the
country maintains over them, the stronger the country's economic
bargaining position relative to foreign direct investors.

b.

The Development Needs of the Developing Countries and the
Value of Foreign Direct Investment: Motivation

If the development planners of a country consider that foreign
direct investment plays a positive role in the development process,
then they will seek to attract investors by offering reasonable or
generous investment terms. They will also be more likely to "play
fairly" with investors in order to maintain an attractive image. 35 On
the other hand, if development planners take a negative view of
foreign direct investment or are indifferent as to whether foreign
investors come or go, then there is no need to maintain an attractive
investment climate or to be cautious or reasonable in negotiations.
In this respect, the bargaining position of the host country government is strengthened if it takes a negative or indifferent view towards foreign direct investment.
There is nothing close to unanimity of opinion concerning the
local investors or purchase turnkey factories, relying on foreign investors only for the supply
of technology and planning expertise.
30. The attractiveness of a consumer market depends on a number of factors such as
population, income, electricity, and cement production, cars in use, etc. For a typical analysis
of consumer market strength see BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, Dec. 25, 1974, at 411.
31. Id.
32. The wage rates which must be paid to employees and the availability of skilled
manpower which reduces training time and cost are important considerations for investors.
It has been the author's experience that among the reasons which TNE's cite for not being
more active in the developing African countries is the lack of skilled or semi-skilled labor.
33. Again, in most cases countries can make demands up to the point where it becomes
more economical for investors to move elsewhere.
34. If a TNE's competitors have already established themselves in a market, the host
government can use their presence as leverage vis-a-vis newcomers. See F. KNICKERBOCKER,
supra note 20, at 197-98.
35. A current example of a country which believes that foreign direct investment is
important to its development aspirations is Egypt, which is trying to promote an investment
"free zone" and to achieve some sort of stability vis-a-vis neighboring Israel. See 13 INT'L
LEGAL MAT'LS 1500 (1974).
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value of foreign direct investment in the development process and
the literature on the subject is extensive. 36 The positive view of
foreign direct investment and its impact on the development process is that it develops the industrial or extractive capabilities of a
country and provides export earnings and import substitution at the
least relative economic cost to the host country. 37 The arguments
against foreign direct investment are both economic38 and sociopolitical, 39 and reflect the concern that nation-states and their citizens might lose control over their own economies and destinies.
c.

Sovereign Authority

The power of sovereign governments to enact or change legislation within their domestic territories gives the developing host country government a powerful bargaining advantage over private foreign direct investors. While international law may provide an investor with legal remedies in the event of an investment dispute, 40 these
36. For additional data on the value of foreign direct investment see The Impact of
Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations, U .N. Doc.
E/5500/Rev. 1, ST/ESN6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Impact Report].
37. See Falk, A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies, 84 YALE L.J. 969, 100607 (1975).
38. Some of the negative economic arguments are that TNE's: (1) tend to export more
capital than they bring into a host country as new investment; (2) by acting as the supplier
of technology tend to reduce domestic incentive towards pursuing indigenous research and
development; (3) use foreign managers to run local firms, thereby discouraging the development of local entrepreneurial talent; (4) pay higher wages than domestic enterprises and
foster socio-economic stratification; and (5) have easier access to local credit and therefore
deprive local investors of access to domestic savings. See Diaz-Alejandro, Direct Foreign
Investment in Latin America, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 23, at 319.
39. The negative view of foreign direct investment is not confined to any particular
geographical area, range of the political spectrum, level of economic development, or class of
society. One has only to look to the U.S. Congress for examples of xenophobic legislation to
curtail such foreign investment. The Dent-Gaydos Bill, H.R. 8951, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)
introduced on June 25, 1973, "to amend the Securities and [sir] Exchange Act of 1934 to
restrict persons who are not citizens of the United States from acquiring . . . more than 5
percentum of the voting securities of any issue whose securities are registered under such act
. . . ."See Note, The Rising Tide of Reserve Flow, 72 MICH. L . REV. 551, 553 (1974). Regarding the fear of foreign economic domination outside the United States, for Latin America,
see Di~z-Alejandro, supra note 38, at 329-32; for Europe, see J. SERVAN-SCHRIEBER, THE
AMERICAN CHALLENGE (1968); for Canada, see Rotstein, Shedding Innocence and Dogma, 1973
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 12; see generally H. STEPHENSON, THE COMING CLASH: THE IMPACT
OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON NATIONAL STATES (1973).
40. See, e.g., Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 553, 556 (1961); Weigel & Weston, Valuation upon the
Deprivation of Foreign Enterprise: A Policy-Oriented Approach to the Problem of Compensation Under Intenational Law, in 1 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 3 (R. Lillich ed. 1972); G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc . A/5217
(1962).
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principles are neither so universally recognized nor so capable of
application and enforcement as to provide investors with effective
means of challenging the decisions of host country governments. 41
The Report of the Group of Eminent Persons to Study the Impact
of Multinational Corporations on the Development Process and on
International Relations 42 states, in fact, that "developing countries
have, of course, the power through legislation, to modify the terms
of agreements. " 43
B.
1.

The Role of Strategy in the Bargaining Process
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BARGAINING POWER AND STRATEGY

Although the economic power relationship between a host country and a foreign investor may determine the terms of an investment
agreement, and a change in this power relationship may result in
the demand for a change in the terms of this agreement, there is
often no one single set of terms which may be acceptable to both
parties. Bargaining strategy, which is more widely discussed by political44 and military 45 scientists than by economists, is employed to
achieve the most advantageous outcome within the range of mutually acceptable outcomes.
2. THE USE OF STRATEGY BY HOST GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN
INVESTOR

Both a developing host country government and a foreign direct
investor may recognize that they are better off to reach some investment agreement than to reach none at all. 46 The strategy objective
41. This is not to imply that foreign governments do not recognize the principle of
compensation in the event of expropriation. While compensation is not always "prompt,
adequate, and effective," it is generally paid in one form or another. However, in situations
which fall short of expropriation, such as the requiring of local equity participation, the
imposition of new taxes, changes in royalty arrangements, etc., foreign investors, because of
the commitments which are already sunk into an investment, usually find themselves in a
take it or leave it situation.
42. See Impact Report, supra note 36, at 38.
43. Id. The Report also suggests that provisions for review of various clauses of investment agreements "after suitable intervals" could be useful under the same circumstances.
For the reaction of the U.S. Government to the Report see State Department, The Views of
the United States Government Concerning the Report of the Group of Eminent Persons on
"The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and International Relations"
(1975).
44. For a discussion of recent works on bargaining theory by political scientists see
Zartman, The Political Analysis of Negotiation: How Who Gets What and When, 26 WORLD
PoL. 385 (1974).
45. See generally T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960).
46. To illustrate, when the developing country government believes that economic reali-
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for the foreign direct investor is to obtain the most attractive investment terms from the host government without demanding so much
as to cause the investment to be disapproved or confiscated. The
strategy objective for the host government is to obtain the largest
possible share of the benefits of the investment without losing the
investment and its benefits altogether.
An example of a bargaining tactic is to establish commitment
to a "principle." By publicly announcing adherence to such a principle, a government or investor places its credibility and reputation
on the line in a bargaining situation.47 A government can announce
that, from a given date forward, it will no. longer permit investors
to maintain more than 49 percent ownership of an investment. With
its credibility riding on the "principle oflocal majority ownership,"
the government enters negotiations in a position from which it cannot back down without damaging its credibility. The government
has publicly given up its option to make a concession and the investor is forced to adjust his bargaining strategy to the established set
of rules. 48
C.

Conclusion

Relationships between foreign direct investors and developing
ties have changed so that it is no longer content with the terms which it originally agreed to
with the foreign investor, it calls for renegotiation of the terms. If the host government
demands too much, the foreign investor may decide that continuing its operation is no longer
econo:m,ically justified and may abandon its investment. If the foreign investor is adamant
in refusing to renegotiate, the host government may confiscate his investment. Assuming that
the foreign investor is making a positive contribution to the host economy, and assuming that
it is also making a profit, then both sides would be left in a worse position.
On the other hand, somewhere between the points of abandonment and of confiscation
is a point or points where both parties could be satisfied with new conditions. The host
government could obtain for itself or its citizens an equity share in the investment and a larger
share of the profits, and the foreign investor could still be making a great enough rate of return
on investment to be satisfied.
47. Secrecy vs. Publicity. A potent means of commitment, and sometimes the
only means, is the pledge of one's reputation. If national representatives can arrange
to be charged with appeasement for every small concession, they place concession
visibly beyond their own reach . . . . Both the initial offer and the final outcome . . .
have to be known; and if secrecy surrounds either point, or if the outcome is inherently not observable, the device is unavailable.
T. SCHELLING, supra note 45, at 29-30.
48. [T]he power of a negotiator often rests on a manifest inability to make
concessions and to meet demands . . . . The very notion that it may be a strategic
advantage to relinquish certain options deliberately, or even to give up all control
over one's future actions and make his responses automatic, seems to be a hard one
to swallow.
Id. at 19.
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host country governments are not static. On the contrary, as the
bargaining power of the host country government increases, the
terms on which foreign direct investments are treated are also subject to change.
This is not necessarily a passive process. Countries can, individually or collectively, take action to increase their bargaining
power relative to foreign direct investors; theoretically, foreign direct investors can do the same. Next, we will examine the steps
which the countries of the Andean Common Market have taken to
increase their bargaining power relative to foreign direct investors,
and will attempt to identify the effects and the problems which this
action has created for both the ANCOM countries and foreign direct
investors.
III.

THE ANDEAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT CODE:
ITS STRUCTURE AND EFFECT ON FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTORS

The system of regional economic integration created by
ANCOM both increases the attractiveness of the member countries
to foreign direct investors49 and increases the bargaining power of
the member countries relative to these investors. 50 The enactment
of the Andean Foreign Investment Code51 and its subsequent imple49. The increased attractiveness results mainly from the gradual reduction of intermarket tariffs as provided for in Chapter V of the Treaty of Cartegena. The tariff reduction
process is going along smoothly and the timetable provided for in the Treaty is expected to
be met. See R. Fullmer, A New Look at the Andean Pact, Mar. 1975, at 3 (U.S. Embassy,
Lima, Peru). Another feature of ANCOM is the program of sectorial allocation which gives
to the various countries a monopoly in certain products. See note 10 supra. The common
external tariff of ANCOM (Chapter VI Treaty of Cartegena) and the prospect of duty-free
access to all the LAFI'A countries provides additional incentive to foreign investors.
50. The combination of sovereign authority and economic resources represented in
ANCOM gives the member states, as a unit, the power potentially to deny an investor access
to a much larger market than existed previously. Countries generally use foreign investment
regulation as a means of attracting foreign investors by offering more generous terms than
their neighbors. The ANCOM countries have chosen to deny themselves, as a group, this
ability to make concessions, and thus they have to some degree denied investors the ability
to play one government off against another.
51. A select bibliography of articles relating to the Code includes Furnish, The Andean
Common Market's Common Regime for Foreign Investments, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 313
(1972); Oliver, Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New Phase in the Quest for Normative
Order, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 763 (1972); Lisocki, The Andean Investment Code, 49 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 317 (1973); Perenzin, Regulation of the Andean Foreign Investment Code: Colombia,
4 LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS 15 (1972); Saavedia, Acuerdo de Cartegena: Inversion extranjeras,
14 DERECHO DE LA INTEGRAc16N 261 (1973); Orrego Vicuna, La incorporacion del ordinamiento
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mentation in the six member countries represents a new trend in the
developing countries towards the treatment of transnational enterprises52 and, if successful, may become a model for future economic
development worldwide. 53 Cooperation, as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries has demonstrated, can bring about
radical economic changes. 54
While the Andean Code provides minim um standards for the
treatment of foreign direct investors in each of the ANCOM members,55 the process of domestic implementation 56 and enforcement57
has been uneven. This reflects the fact that the attitude towards
foreign direct investment embodied in the Code is more consistent
with the internal policies and economic needs of some of the member countries-such as Venezuela and Peru-than it is with the
policies and needs of others-such as Bolivia and Chile. Herein lies
one of the major difficulties of both the AN COM compact and other
cooperative international arrangements: 58 nations tend to identify
juridico subregional al derecho interno, 11 DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACI6N 39 (1972). Also, there
has been a proliferation of business-oriented publications concerning the Code. See, e.g.,
COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS, ANDEAN PACT: DEFINITION, DESIGN AND ANALYSIS (1973).
52. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
53. The Andean Code is cited with praise in the United Nations report Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations, and several of its major
provisions are suggested as means of changing the role of foreign investors in developing
countries. See Impact Report, supra note 36, at 59-62.
54. See Section 111.D. of the text.
55. Article 33 of the Andean Code provides that:
With respect to the matters covered by this regime, the rights established herein for
foreign and mixed enterprises are the maximum which may be granted to them by
the Member Countries.
11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126, 137 (1972).
56. In Bolivia the text of the Andean Code was established as a part of national law
through Decree Law 9798, issued June 30, 1971. In Chile, the Andean Code was ratified by
Decree Law 482 issued by S. Allende. Decree Law 746, reaffirming Chile's adherence to the
Code following a major confrontation over it with other ANCOM members, was issued in
November 1974. Although the Code was initially ratified in Colombia by Presidential Decree
1299 and Regulation D2153 issued on July 3, 1971, this Decree was declared unconstitutional
by the Colombian Supreme Court. After the Colombian Congress gave the President authority to ratify the Code, it was implemented by Decree Law 1900 on September 15, 1973.
Ecuador ratified the Code by Supreme Decree 974 on June 30, 1971. In Peru, the Andean Code
was ratified by Decree Laws 18900 of June 30, 1971, and 18999 of October 18, 1971. Venezuela,
which ratified its entry into ANCOM and its acceptance of the Andean Code in September
of 1973, was accepted for ANCOM membership and had the Code effectively ratified on
January 1, 1974. Implementation of the Andean Foreign Investment Code, State Department
memorandum, ARA, June 11, 1975.
57. See Section 111.B. of the text.
58. The controversies in the European Economic Community regarding the flow of farm
products is a good example of this. England, for example, has been reluctant to permit its
agricultural sector to face competition from other EEC members and has often accused other
members of "dumping" their surplus produce on English markets.
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with and to pursue their individual interests more forcefully than
they do their interests in international cooperation. 59
The provisions of the Andean Code can be roughly divided into
three major categories: (1) those concerning equity ownership and
control; (2) those regulating the business operations of firms; and
(3) those relating to the transfer of technology.

A.

Provisions Relating to Equity Ownership and Control

1.

THE DIVESTMENT REQUIREMENT

Foreign-owned and controlled enterprises, other than those
which fall into either of two exempted categories, are required gradually to divest themselves of majority ownership and control 60 over
a 15 or 20 year period following entry into ANCOM. 61 Foreign-owned
enterprises which were present in ANCOM countries before the enactment and implementation of the Code are required to declare
their intention to divest within three years following the date of the
Code's implementation, 62 if they want their products to enjoy duty59. This is for the most part due to the fact that governments are more accountable to
their constituents than they are to the international communities.
60. Foreign enterprises are required to transform into so-called "mixed-enterprises."
Mixed enterprises are made up of between 51 and 80 percent local ownership and control over
firm decision-making must be in the hands of local (or "national") investors. National authorities must approve the control arrangements. Decision 47 of the Andean Commission
provides that a "mixed enterprise" may also be one in which at least 30 percent ownership
and effective control is in the hands of the State. See Decision 47, 10 DERECHO DE LA
INTEGRACl6N 197 (1972).
61. A transformation timetable is provided in Article 30. Article 31 contains certain
provisions which must be stipulated in a transformation agreement. The typical transformation timetable requires that 15 percent of stock, assets, or rights must be placed on sale for
national investors at the time of entry into ANCOM (except in Bolivia and Ecuador, where
the Code provides that for an initial three-year period foreign investors may maintain 100
percent ownership). Within one-third of the transformation period-15 years in Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela-30 percent of ownership must be in local hands. Within two-thirds
of the period, 45 percent must be so situated, and before the date of completion at least 51
percent ownership and effective control must be maintained by national investors (for Bolivia
and Ecuador the transformation timetables are somewhat different). Decision 24, 11 INT'L
LEGAL MAT'Ls 126, 136-37 (1972). While the transformation agreement registered with the host
government must contain a system which insures the sale of ownership rights to local investors, there are some difficulties inherent in this requirement. See text accompanying notes
117-22 infra.
62. The Code, as we have seen, was implemented at different times in the various
member countries. Therefore, the three-year limit on declaring an intention to divest is
different for the various countries. In addition, both Bolivia and Ecuador have declared that,
because of their least developed status, their timetables will not be started earlier than the
last of the other members. From a reading of Venezuela's implementing Decrees, it appears
that this date would be January 1, 1977.
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free status within the common market. Subsequent to the enactment of the Code, the Andean Commission has ruled that companies existing in ANCOM prior to the Code may declare their intention to divest after the three-year deadline; but when this intention
is declared, the company must meet the transformation percentages
in force at that time. 63
Foreign-owned companies are required to register the value of
their investment with the office of the competent authority in the
host country. 64 According to the Code, the value of an investment
may include financial capital, plant, machinery, or equipment, 65
but it may not include intangible or technological contributions
such as patents, licenses, or trademarks. 66 The valuation which is
agreed upon with the competent authority is of great importance to
the investor, not only in determining the amount for which the
enterprise can be sold to local investors, 67 but in calculating, as well,
the amount of profits which can be annually remitted abroad or
reinvested. 68 Because the authorities of the individual member
countries are responsible for concluding the valuation agreement
with the individual investor, the negotiations for an agreed valuation provide a degree of flexibility which the parties can use to
reconcile their interests.
2.

EXEMPTIONS FROM THE DIVESTMENT REQUIREMENT

There are two major categories of enterprises which are exempt
from the divestment requirement described above. The first concerns foreign enterprises in the extractive industries, or the so-called
"basic products" sector. 69 The individual member countries are permitted to regulate firms in the basic products sector in any way they
63. See Ancom Balks at Sectorial Plans but Rules on Fadeout, Patents, BUSINESS LATIN
AMERICA, June 12, 1974, at 186.
64. Decision 24, art. 5, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 126, 130 (1972).
65. Decision 24, art. 1, id. at 128.
66. Decision 24, art. 21, id. at 134. Intangible technological contributions, although not
defined in the body of the Code, are referred to in Annex 1. In addition, implementing
legislation such as that of Venezuela makes it clear that patents, trademarks, technical
services contracts, and the like cannot be included in the valuation. See Decree 63, art. 59,
13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1220, 1231 (1974).
67. See text accompanying notes 117-22 infra.
68. See Section III.B. of the text.
69. The basic products sector is defined to include "primary activities of exploration and
exploitation of minerals of any kind, including liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons, gas
pipelines, oil pipelines, and exploitation of forests." Decision 24, art. 40, 11 INT'L LEGAL
MAT'Ls 126, 135 (1972).
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see fit. 70 While this exemption reflects the fact that uniform regulation of the extractive industries might present difficult problems for
ANCOM because of the uneven distribution of mineral resources
and unequal development of the extractive industries sectors, 71 exemption from ANCOM regulation cannot be interpreted as a boon
for investors. 72 Recent events in Venezuela provide witness to this
fact. 73
There are other groups of activities for which the Andean Code
provides special treatment, but the individual member governments may provide exemption from this treatment, and control
TNE's by national regulations that they consider appropriate. 74 The
Code provides that no new foreign direct investments may be made
in the "public services" sector, 75 in insurance, commercial banking,
and other financial institutions, 76 or in domestic transportation,
advertising, radio, newspapers, magazines, or other enterprises related to domestic marketing. 77 In the public services sector, existing
firms may continue to operate and may make new investments
which are necessary for efficient operation. Foreign banks 78 may
continue to operate, but they must cease receiving local deposits
within three years of the Code's entry into force unless they agree
to convert into "national" enterprises. The enterprises in the domestic marketing activities mentioned must convert into national
enterprises within three years.
70. Decision 24, art. 44, id. at 140. The exemption for the basic products sector includes
an exemption from the profit remittance ceiling.
71. For example, in regards to the unequal distribution of resources, Chile, as one of the
world's leading exporters of copper, would be extremely reluctant to have this sector of its
economy governed by ANCOM regulations. In regard to unequal development, while
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru all have substantial petroleum deposits, their petroleum industries are at very different stages of development. Therefore, different standards of treatment must be accorded to investors in order to allow the lesser developed to encourage
investment, while the more developed, for example, Venezuela, can nationalize.
72. Peru, for example, has announced its intention to eventually nationalize its
extractive industries. See generally Plan Inca, PERUVIAN TIMES, July 1974. For a Spanish text
of Plan Inca see Expreso (Lima), July 29, 1974 (Special Supplement).
73. The Venezuelan Congress passed the petroleum nationalization bill in August 1975.
See N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1975, at 45, col. 2.
74. Decision 24, art. 44, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126, 140 (1972).
75. Public services are defined as "drinking water, sewage, electric power, illumination,
garbage collection, and sanitary, telephone, mail and telecommunications services." Decision
24, art. 41, id. at 139.
76. Decision 24, art. 42, id. at 139.
77. Decision 24, art. 43, id. at 139.
78. No mention is made in the Code as to what regulations the insurance industry or
"other financial institutions" are subject to, other than that no new investments may be made
in them. Decision 24, art. 42, id. at 139.
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The member countries may, however, choose to apply different
standards of regulation for any or all of the above mentioned activities, and several have done so. 79 Some of the member countries have
added additional sectors to those which are reserved for "national"
enterprises. 80
Finally, enterprises which export at least 80 percent of their
production to non-ANCOM markets are exempted from all divestment requirement. Those products which remain in ANCOM will
not, however, enjoy duty-free status. 81
B.

Questions Regarding the Divestment Requirement

There are several significant questions regarding the divestment requirement of the Andean Code which present themselves to
the foreign investor. The first is the question of whether the Code
provisions requiring divestment of majority equity ownership and
control are being strictly enforced by the ANCOM countries, or
whether the Code has merely established a set of "rules of the game"
which may be broken when the circumstances call for it.
1.

STRICT ENFORCEMENT OR "RULES OF THE GAME?"

Although empirical data on the performance of individual firms
79. In Bolivia, Supreme Decree 11450, June 1974, exempts banking and financial institutions from the Code's provisions. See State Department memorandum, supra note 56, at 1.
In Chile, Decree Law 748, Nov. 7, 1974, exempts development banks, and Decree Law 818,
December 27, 1974, exempts commercial banks from the Code. Id. at 2. In Colombia, Decree
No. 2719 of December 28, 1973, exempts banks, commercial financial institutions, and companies engaged in domestic marketing from the Code. Decree 295 of February 24, 1975,
provides that foreign banks and credit institutions must transform into mixed companies
under the supervision of a new Commission. Decree 169 of January 31, 1975, regulates companies involved in domestic marketing activities. See Airgram No. A-66 from the U.S. Embassy
in Bogota, Colombia, to the Department of State, Apr. 2, 1974. In Ecuador, Supreme Decree
1029 of July 31, 1971, exempted all specially treated sectors from the Code. Resolutions 01 to
105 issued in January 1975 substituted internal regulations for most of these sectors and
added others. See note 80 infra. Peru has not invoked the escape clause. Venezuela has chosen
not to invoke the escape clause in most instances but has indicated that special regulations
will be issued for banks and other financial institutions. Decree 62, art. 4, 13 INT'L LEGAL
MAT'Ls 1220, 1221 (1974). Venezuela has, like Peru, added additional sectors to the "national"
category. See note 80 infra.
80. Pursuant to Decision 24, art. 38, Ecuador has ruled that construction firms must
transform into national enterprises. 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 126, 138 (1972). Venezuela has
added "professional services" to the national enterprise category. The professional services
sectors, vaguely defined, is regulated by domestic law and reserved to national enterprises.
Decree 62, art. 1, 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1220 (1974).
81. Decision 24, art. 34, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126, 137 (1972).
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in ANCOM is scarce, 82 it seems clear that both the member country
governments and foreign direct investors are taking the divestment
requirement seriously. Several qualifications regarding this conclusion must be made. First, the initial date for the divestment decision of existing companies has not yet been reached in most of the
member countries. 83 Therefore, whether or not firms would have
been forced to divest at this date in order to enjoy ANCOM dutyfree status can only be verified by the example of Peru and the
pronouncements of the other host country governments. However,
the ANCOM countries have tempered their original all-or-nothing
position 84 by providing that firms may bypass the initial date if it
is not essential that their products enjoy duty-free status, and that
they may decide at a future date on divestment. 85
The data from Peru indicate that the Peruvian government has
strictly enforced the initial divestment deadline, 86 going even beyond the rules as now provided by the Andean Code. Peru required
that manufacturing firms meet the initial divestment deadline in
order to enjoy ANCOM tariff concessions, and enacted a General
82. The most thorough and reliable source on individual firm behavior which is publicly
available is a weekly publication Business Latin America published by Business International
Corp. This reference is used not only by businessmen, but by government officials in the
United States and Latin America. While the author worked in the General Counsel's Office
of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and had access to material relating to the
application of the Code vis-a-vis U.S. firms, this information is not available for publication.
Nothing in this Article in any way reflects the opinions of the U.S. Government or OPIC.
83. Colombia did not implement the Code until September 15, 1973, and Venezuela not
until January 1, 1974. Therefore, for Colombia the initial divestment decision need not be
made until September 15, 1976, and for Peru, January 1, 1977. See note 58 supra. In Peru,
the initial date was reached and the divestment requirement was enforced. See note 85 infra.
Chile has had a great deal of internal debate over when and how the Code was implemented,
and though technically, the initial date for enforcement has passed, there is no evidence of
firms divesting (although most were expropriated during the Allende administration).
84. Originally, Article 28 of the Code provided that existing firms had to decide within
three years of the date of the Code's entry into force as to whether they intended to divest
and take advantage of the duty-free market. See note 61 supra.
85. This change was made by a ruling of the Andean Commission, in June 1974, not by
an amendment to the Code. The ruling provides that companies which have not provided
divestment plans by the three-year deadline will lose ANCOM tariff concessions, but may
subsequntly choose to divest and gain them. However the final deadline for divestment
remains the same. See Ancom Balks at Sectorial Plans But Rules on Fadeout, Patents,
BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, June 12, 1974, at 186.
86. See Peruvian Firms Use Comunidad to Meet Fade-Out Requirements, BUSINESS
LATIN AMERICA, June 5, 1974, at 183. This article resulted from a survey which Business Latin
America conducted among companies located in Peru. The results are that the great majority
of companies met the initial deadline requirement by selling 15 percent ownership to a worker
comunidad. See note 87 infra.
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Industries Law which requires that firms gradually sell 50 percent
of their equity to a worker "communidad." 87 Foreign firms were
given little choice whether or not to accept the initial deadline, since
failure to meet it would result both in permanent loss of ANCOM
duty-free privileges and a divestment of ownership. Peru, however,
must be regarded as a special case within ANCOM because of its
radical economic policies. 88 Existing manufacturing enterprises in
other ANCOM countries have yet to be forced into divestment.
The second observation which can be made from the available
empirical data is that, almost without exception, new companies
entering AN COM are entering as joint ventures from the outset, not
only meeting with the Code's initial local participation requirement
but in most cases surpassing it. 89 These companies are finding partners either in the private sector or with local governments.
A third observation-a judgment made from readings of official
AN COM government pronouncements, 90 business world reaction, 91
87. Peru's General Industries Law of 1970, Decree Law 18350, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1225
(1970), provides that manufacturing companies must sell at least 50 percent of their equity
ownership to a workers group called the comunidad. This is accomplished by providing the
comunidad with 15 percent of the firm's pre-tax profits each year until the comunidad has
purchased 50 percent of equity.
88. For a statement of Peruvian economic ideology see Plan Inca, supra, note 72.
89. The empirical data in this case come from a three-year survey the author made of
articles in Business Latin America. Of 18 major new foreign direct investments reported for
the AN COM countries between 1972 and mid-1975, 13 were begun as joint ventures with local
participation above 30 percent. All five of the new investments beginning with 100 percent
of capital were headed for Bolivia and Ecuador where firms need not have any local participation until five years after production begins (and then only five percent). The limitation on
this data is, of course, that if companies are actually making secret deals with ANCOM
governments, these deals are not likely to be reported in any publication.
90. In Venezuela, President Perez's nationalist economic policies and the text of Decrees
62 and 63 themselves make it clear that Venezuela intends to apply the divestment requirements rigorously. See Decision 24 in Venezuela: Harsher than Anticipated, BUSINESS LATIN
AMERICA, May 29, 1974, at 175-76.
In Peru, the statements of President Velasco and the requirement of compliance with the
General Industries Law make divestment a certainty. Velasco's credibility rides on his treatment of TNE's. For Colombia, the government may be slightly less enthusiastic about the
divestment requirement than Peru or Venezuela, but it nevertheless has indicated that it fully
intends to meet its international commitments. See An In-Depth Look At What Really Is
Happening in Colombia, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, June 25, 1975, at 201-02. Ecuador surprised
many foreign businessmen with its tough internal implementation of the Code. See Ecuador
Puts New Slant on ANCOM Rules, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, Apr. 23, 1975, at 136. With its
new oil income, Ecuador can afford to be tough with investors. Chile and Bolivia are the two
ANCOM countries which have vacillated most with respect to the Code: Chile attempting
to ·change several Code rules with the passage of Decree 600 and declaring the Code unimplemented then later backing down on all of these points. See Andean Countries Challenge
Chile's Investment Law, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, Sept. 25, 1974, at 312; Ancom Solution to
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and unclassified U.S. Government reports 92-is that the ANCOM
governments, most forcefully Peru and Venezuela, intend to apply
the divestment requirement vigorously. As of yet, there is little reason to doubt the good faith of these pronouncements. However, as
the modification of the initial timetable deadline and the hedging
by Bolivia and Chile 93 have shown, the ANCOM Commission and
some of the member countries are attempting to adapt to specific
economic circumstances when necessary.
2.

CAPITAL MARKETS

A second important question regarding the divestment requirement is whether sufficient local capital will be available to purchase
majority equity ownership at fair prices.
While the domestic capital markets of the ANCOM countries
are not particularly well developed, it does not appear that capital
for divestment will be lacking. In the first place, foreign companies
will have between 15 and 20 years to complete the divestment process, so that local capital may be generated slowly. Divestment
would not require large lump-sum payments. Second, petroleum
export revenues from Venezuela and Ecuador have substantially
improved the capital base of these countries, and Venezuela is channeling significant amounts of capital to regional lending institutions
at commercial rates. 94 Third, Peru has created a unique profit sharing plan which firms expect to provide the capital for divestment. 95
Finally, international and regional lending institutions (for examInvestment Code Controversy Shows Strong Solidarity of Bloc, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, Nov.
27, 1974, at 384. Bolivia claims that firms which intend only to supply its market need not
divest. See State Department memorandum, supra note 56, and BOLIVIA, LEY DE INVERSIONES
68-76 (1972).
91. In both Business Latin America and the Latin American Economic Report, businessmen reflect a resignation to the fact that the divestment requirement will, in fact, be enforced.
92. U.S. Government Embassy unclassified reports consistently advise U.S. businessmen that they should expect to comply with the Code and the divestment requirement. See,
e.g., Airgram No. A-221 from the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, Colombia, to the Department of
State, Dec. 31, 1974, at 10, which states "Colombia will, of course, continue to apply the
Andean Foreign Investment Code." See also Airgram A-36 from the U.S. Embassy in Quito,
Ecuador, to the Secretary of State, Apr. 24, 1975, at 7; Airgram A-69 from the U.S. Embassy
in Caracas, Venezuela, to the Department of State, Apr. 22, 1975, at 2.
93. See note 90 supra.
94. Venezuela has made $500 million available to other Latin American countries
through the IDB which can be used for commercial purposes. See Inter-American
Development Bank- Venzuelan Fondo de Inversiones: Trust Fund to Contribute to the
Financing of Economic Projects, 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 315 (1975).
95. See note 87 supra.
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ple, the Andean Development Corporation, created mainly to aid
divestment) have taken an active interest in aiding the ANCOM
countries in the divestment process. 96
3. How THE DIVESTMENT REQUIREMENT SHOULD AFFECT INVESTOR
DECISION-MAKING
The major disadvantage of loss of equity ownership and eventual loss of managerial control over a foreign subsidiary operation
is that the parent company and the new local owners may disagree
over how the subsidiary should be operated. The relinquishment of
control over corporate decision-making can present problems, such
as whether profits should be distributed or retained and invested;
to what markets products should be exported; and whether
patents, trademarks, and the like should be sold to other firms.
For the great majority of manufacturing firms these problems
are probably not tremendously significant, since it can be generally
assumed that local investors and foreign investors share the same
desire to maximize the return on investment. The firms for which
these problems may be more acute are those in high-technology
industries where control over technological resources may be at a
premium. The firms most resistant to the divestment program are
those which are least interested in giving up control over new production processes and products. 97
As a matter of policy, new foreign direct investments should
probably be made as joint ventures with substantial local equity
participation from the outset. By forming local partnerships with
either private investors or governments, the foreign investor can
avoid many of the bureaucratic entanglements involved in the gradual divestment process. Thus, the investor would have less concern
over whether local capital will be available when the time for divestment comes, whether disagreements with local bureaucracies over
share valuations will arise, whether confiscatory taxes will be levied,
and related problems arising in dealings with any complex but not
yet fully developed bureaucratic structure. By establishing a sub96. The divestment bank scheme, originally proposed by A. Hirschman, came to life in
the form of the Andean Development Corporation which provides investment capital to
Andean investors. See A. HIRSCHMAN, How TO DIVEST IN LATIN AMERICA AND WHY (1968);
Fresard Rios, El Tratado que creo la Corporaci6n Andena de Fomento, 3 DERECHO DE LA
lNTEGRACION 28 (1968); Andean Loan Body Gets New Financial Muscle, BUSINESS LATIN
AMERICA, Feb. 19, 1975, at 60.
97. Vernon discusses the problems of the highly innovative firm regarding divestment
programs in VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 3, at 265-70.
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stantial local partnership, the foreign investor is likely to obtain
more favored treatment from local government officials because the
investment will be perceived as providing greater local benefits, and
because major local investors are more likely to be on friendly terms
with local government officials.
Because divestment of managerial control can only take place
at the end of a 15 or 20 year period, an optimal arrangement for the
foreign investor is local equity participation, combined with maintenance of managerial control until the last available date. In this
manner, the foreign investor trades his technological resources and
managerial expertise for the maximum period of decision-making
authority.
For investors with projects already operating within ANCOM,
the decision of whether to divest and take advantage of the tariff
elimination program, or to retain ownership and control and to supply primarily local markets, depends again on a careful cost-benefit
analysis. Firms which are under-utilizing productive capabilities
and whose products could easily be transported to other markets
within ANCOM may gain from trading equity for an expanded
market area. On the other hand, firms which are oriented primarily
to local markets and whose productive capacities are geared only to
meet these markets (which may prefer exporting to third country
markets) would discover little incentive for transformation.
As a general rule, the only firms which may be reluctant to
accept the divestment requirement are those which place a premium on their technology, production processes, and trade names.
However, for firms whose competitive advantages lie more in the
areas of capital investment capabilities, managerial expertise, and
marketing capabilities, the divestment program does not create a
substantial disincentive to investment in ANCOM.

C.

Provisions of the Andean Code Affecting Operations

The Andean Code prescribes a comprehensive set of provisions
which regulate the operations of foreign-owned firms within
ANCOM. These provisions include: (1) a ceiling on the amount of
net profits which can be remitted abroad; (2) a limitation on the
amount of net profits which can be reinvested in the enterprise; (3)
regulations of the transfer of capital gains abroad; (4) regulation of
the amount of interest which can be paid to amortize loans; (5)
restrictions on access to local credit; (6) a system to oversee transfer
pricing practices; (7) the assertion of domestic jurisdiction for the
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settlement of investment disputes; (8) a series of regulations on
agreements for the transfer of technology, patents, trademarks, licenses, and royalties.
The Andean Code provides that foreign investors are limited to
remitting net profits of up to 14 percent of the value of the registered
investment annually. 98 The value of the investment is registered
with the competent local authority when the firm enters the host
country or, in the case of existing firms, as of a date set by local
officials. The Andean Code provides general rules regarding valuation. The value of the investment may include foreign capital,
machinery, and equipment, 99 but it may not include intangibles
such as patents or trademarks.1 00 However, beyond these general
rules and a listing of certain specifics which must be contained in
registration forms 101 the method to be used in determining valuation
has been left to local authorities.1°2 The valuation procedure is important both in terms of profit and reinvestment because the
amount of net profits which may be remitted abroad is limited to a
percentage of the registered value of the investment in terms of
capital gains restrictions. 163
The effective control of profit remittances depends upon maintaining an effective system of foreign exchange controls. While a few
of the AN COM countries did not maintain a foreign exchange regulating system before the Code was adopted, this is being remedied. 104
While foreign companies may, with the help of the host govern98. Article 37 of the Code reads:
Upon authorization by the competent national authority, f<;>reign investors shall have
the right to transfer abroad, in fully convertible currency, the verified net profits
resulting from the foreign direct investment, but not in excess of 14 percent of that
investment annually.
In special cases, the Commission may, upon the request of any Member Country,
authorize higher percentages than that provided in this Article.
Decision 24, art. 37, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126, 138 (1972).
99. Decision 24, art. 1, id. at 128.
100. Decision 24, art. 21, id. at 134.
101. Decision 24, annex 1, id. at 144.
102. Decision 24, arts. 5 & 6, id. at 130.
103. See text accompanying notes 114-19 infra.
104. Venezuela, for example, maintained no foreign exchange controls at all before it
implemented the Code. See INVESTING, LICENSING, AND TRADING CONDITIONS ABROAD, Aug.
1974, at 12. Chapter VII of Decree 63, however, authorizes the Supertendency of Foreign
Investments to regulate remittance of profits abroad. In addition, Venezuela's Decree 63
prescribes penalties for firms which remit profits above their authorized level. For the first
offense the amount of profits which were illegally remitted must be reimbursed to the Centra.l
Bank of Venezuela. For a second infraction, the firm's negotiation is cancelled and the foreign
investor must offer his share of the investment for acquisition by national investors.
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ment, petition the Andean Commission for special profit treatment
(and there is indication that requests for special treatment are generally granted 105 ) the 14 percent profit ceiling has nevertheless been
the subject of debate within the ANCOM system, and it is possible
that this ceiling will be adjusted in the not-too-distant future. 106
Some of the arguments which could be cited against the 14 percent
profit ceiling are: (1) interest rates for commercial borrowing and
inflation rates both in the developed and developing countries are
too high to make a 14 percent rate of remittance on investment
either attractive or reasonable; (2) once the ANCOM countries have
fully integrated their system of foreign exchange controls, alternative means of remitting profits other than as declared earnings will
be prohibited-and, therefore, levels of declared net profits will increase;107 and (3) since TNE's are prohibited from capitalizing intangibles and paying royalties from subsidiaries to parents some
additional compensation should be added as an adjustment. 108
In addition to limiting the amount of net profits which a foreign
investor may remit abroad, the Andean Code also limits the amount
of net profits which can be reinvested in an enterprise without prior
authorization from the competent national authority. In the absence of authorization, foreign investors are limited to a five percent
net profit reinvestment annually, calculated as a percentage of the
registered investment. Up to the five percent limit, reinvestments
must still be registered with the national authorities. 109
The question arises as to what may be done with profits above
the 19 percent level-that is, the 14 percent remittance plus the five
percent reinvestment limit-in the absence of additional reinvestment authorization. Foreign firms may make new investments in
the host country, but these new investments must be applied for
and authorized just as new investments coming from abroad. 11 °Foreign investors may invest in other national or mixed firms, provided
that such investment can be made without purchasing shares al105. Interview with Louis Goodman, Staff Associate of Social Science Research Council,
in New York City, Apr. 14, 1974.
106. The profit ceiling question has been on the Commission's agenda and there seems
little strong objection to having it changed. See Andean Code Changes Proposed, BUSINESS
LATIN AMERICA, Sept. 25, 1974, at 312.
107. Reported rates of return on investment from manufacturing companies in Latin
America have fallen in the 10 to 20 percent range. See La Investment and ROI Prospects Turn
Favorable for US Firms, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, Nov. 20, 1974, at 370-71.
108. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
109. Decision 24, art. 13, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126, 132 (1972).
110. There is no bar in the Code against using excess profits to establish a new enterprise.
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ready held by national investors, 111 and that the investment does not
change the mixed or national character of the enterprise.11 2 Finally,
Decision 70 of the Andean Commission lists certain types of local
bond issues which can be purchased with "excess profits" without
the requirement of authorization.11 3
The provisions in the Andean Code regarding the reexportation of a foreign investor's capital abroad are perhaps the
most ambiguous provisions in the Code, 114 and therefore leave a good
measure of discretion in the hands of the individual member government. It appears that foreign investors are limited in their reexportation of capital to the amount of the investment authorized
and registered with local authorities. 115 In addition, the foreign direct investor must agree with the local authorities, at the time the
investment is registered, on the method which is to be used to value
his shares at the time of sale for divestment purposes.11 6 The valuation procedure which is used by the local authorities becomes, as it
does with the profit remittance regulations~ 117 of primary importance to the foreign investor. By inflating or deflating the value of
the initially registered investment, the local authorities can either
111. Decision 24, art. 3, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'I..S 126, 129 (1972).
112. Decision 24, art. 4, id. at 130.
113. By Resolution 6074, September 1974, Venezuela defines these securities to include,
inter alia, public debt instruments, mortgage bonds issued by Venezuelan mortgage banks,
commercial bonds which grant no right of participation in the management of the company,
and obligations issued by the Andean Development Corp. State Department memorandum,
supra note 56, at 5.
In addition, some foreign investors have reported that they are allowed to use their excess
profits for local expenses not directly related to their businesses, for example intra-company
airfare costs.
114. The provisions of the Code which deal directly with the question of capital reexportation are Articles 7-10 inclusive. Decision 24, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'I..S 126, 131 (1972).
115. This interpretation follows from Article 8, which provides that:
[R]e-exportable capital is understood to be the capital formed by the total of the
original foreign direct investment which is registered and actually made, plus the
reinvestments made in the same enterprise in accordance with the provisions of this
regime and minus net losses, if any.
In cases of participation of national investors the foregoing provisions should be
understood to be limited to the percentage of the direct foreign investment in connection with the reinvestments made and with the net losses.
Decision 24, art. 8, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'I..S 126, 131 (1972).
This amount would include additional new foreign investments made in the enterprise
which are authorized and registered.
116. Decision 24, art. 31. Id. at 137. The need for this valuation procedure reflects the
fact that there are no operational "stock markets" in any of the AN COM countries and that,
when the time for divestment approaches, local private capital may be scarce. Therefore,
share values will have to be administratively determined.
117. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
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increase or decrease the permissible level of profit remittances and
the maximum amount which the investor can receive at the time of
the sale of his share in the enterprise. Thus the valuation procedure
provides both government and investor with a bargaining flexibility
which is lacking in other areas of the Code.
Whether the foreign direct investor is limited in capital reexportation to the amount of the registered investment is not absolutely clear. Neither the Andean Commission nor local implementing legislation has done much to settle the ambiguity surrounding
these provisions. The Code could just as easily be interpreted to
indicate that investors may re-export whatever amount of capital is
received at the time his shares are sold. 118
In either case, the investor does not face a capital loss at the
time of sale, since for tax purposes he will have depreciated the
value of his assets on his own records. The foreign investor is, however, required to pay whatever taxes the host country may impose
on the sale of his assets to local investors before re-exportation. 119 A
great deal depends upon the discretion of the local authorities and
upon the foreign investor's ability to bargain with them effectively.
The Andean Code regulations govern credit transactions. All
contracts for external credit must be authorized and registered by
competent local authorities. 120 Payments made to amortize loans
from abroad must be authorized by local officials in accordance with
registered contracts. 121 In addition, the Code limits the amount of
interest which may be paid on an intra-company loan between a
foreign parent or affiliate and an ANCOM subsidiary to not more
than three percent above the going rate of interest on first class
loans in the country from which the loan is made. 122 Finally, foreign
enterprises are denied access to other than short-term local credit
118. This interpretation of the Code proceeds from both the Code and the national
implementing legislation. Article 10 reads: "Foreign investors shall have the right to transfer
abroad the amounts obtained from the sale of their shares, participation, or rights, after
payment of the pertinent taxes." Decision 24, art. 10, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 126, 131 (1972).
Venezuela's implementing legislation is typified by Decree 63, Article 33, which reads: "Foreign investors shall be entitled to remit abroad the amount resulting from the sale of their
shares, participations, rights to national investors or from the liquidation of the company."
13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1221, 1226 (1974).
119. Decision 24, art. 10, 11 INT' L LEGAL MAT'Ls 126, 131 (1972). This provision on the
application of domestic taxes to re-exported capital may lead to the conclusion that the
investor is better off in obtaining substantial local equity participation at the outset of the
investment.
120. Decision 24, art. 14, id. at 132.
121. Decision 24, art. 16, id.
122. Decision 24, art. 16, id.
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in accordance with rules to be established by the Andean Commission.123
In order to effectively control the flow of foreign exchange out
of the ANCOM countries, the Andean Code authorizes the member
countries to establish an "information and price control system of
intermediate products that may be furnished by suppliers of foreign
capital and technology." 124 The system grew out of a study which
showed that profits were regularly taken out ofColombia by TNE's
as inflated payments made by subsidiaries to parents for intermediate products and not as declared earnings.125
The establishment of effective transfer-pricing controls requires
the creation of a highly efficient bureaucracy. Data on the armslength prices of an enormous amount of intermediate goods must be
accumulated and stored for retrieval, while prices undergo continuous change. The practicality of such a system was questioned by
Senator Javits in the Report of the Group of Eminent Persons. 126
Reports from the ANCOM countries have yet to indicate that substantial progress is being made in the development of such a system.
The Andean Code prohibits the inclusion, in agreements concerning foreign investments or the transfer of technology, of clauses
which remove jurisdiction over investment disputes from the host
country. The Code also prohibits the subrogation of foreign states
to the rights of its national investors in the event of investment
disputes. 127 The provision on subrogation is principally directed towards government operated investment insurance companies-such
as the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation 128-which succeed to the rights of their national investors after the payment of a
claim (for example, for expropriation compensation) in order to permit the use of diplomatic intervention to obtain compensation from
host country governments. 129 The provision by the ANCOM govern123. Decision 24, art. 17, id.
124. Decision 24, art. 6(c), id. at 131.
125. See generally Vaitsos, Transfer of Resources and Preservation of Monopoly Rents,
in HARVARD UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REPORT
No. 168 (1970). See also, on the role of transfer pricing in the remittance of profits, Impact
Report, supra note 36, at 74-75.
126. See Impact Report, supra note 36, at 99.
127. Decision 24, art. 51, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 126, 141 (1972).
128. Several developed country governments now operate programs of foreign investment guarantees for their national investors.
129. OPIC's legislative purpose is to stimulate the flow of U .S. private capital into less
developed countries by guaranteeing these investments against political risks and providing
developmental loans. See, e.g., Public L . No. 93-390 (Aug. 27, 1974) . Since OPIC operates
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ments that investment disputes may only be decided in the host
country does not mean that a foreign investor could not appeal a
denial of justice to an international tribunal and seek whatever
remedies are available under international law.

D.

Provisions Regulating the Transfer of Technology

The AN COM countries attach great value to the role of modern
technology in the industrial development process. 130 The goal of
ANCOM technology policy is to acquire necessary technology from
abroad at the least possible cost and with the fewest strings attached,131 and simultaneously to improve local research and development capabilities. 132
The ANCOM countries have developed a new attitude towards
the transfer of technology from abroad, whose impact is only beginning to be felt by foreign direct investors. 133 In essence, the attitude
derives from the belief that technology should not be
commercialized, but that developed country industries should make
it freely or cheaply available to developing countries.1 34 Research
on a self-sustaining basis, however, it must require compensation from host country governments or rapidly deplete its insurance reserves. OPIC seeks compensation only as required
by general principles of international law and not through U.S. Government diplomatic
intimidation.
130. The introductory portion of Decision 84 of the Andean Commission reads in part:
"Our contemporary world is characterized by the controlling influence that is inherent in the
possession of know-how and the capacity to utilize it in economic and social orientation." See
13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1478 (1974).
131. The ANCOM countries relate their previous relation to technology transfer as follows:
Member Nations have had recourse to external services in a proponderant form to
satisfy the needs of technical development, with such undesirable results as the
following solutions inadequate to the characteristics of economic development of the
Member Nations and to the availability of productive factors; extremely elevated
costs; limited possibility to exercise a choice among various alternative solutions; the
displacement of local operations and elements, and the underutilization of local
scientific and technological resources; a conditioning of political and economic decisions to technological solution imposed from abroad; and a miscellany of unsatisfied
needs due to the inadequacy of technological solutions .
Decision 84, id. at 1478.
132. Decision 84, para. 5, id. at 1481.
133. This impact comes as the AN COM countries gradually require investors to conform
their technology agreements to the Andean Code's regulations. Venezuela has, for example,
given foreign investors until December 31, 1975, to have their contracts approved by the
Superintendency of Foreign Investments; after which, contracts which do not conform will
cease to have legal effect. Decree 63, arts. 61 & 63, 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1221, 1232 (1974).
134. See generally Junta del Acuerdo de Cartegena, Policies Relating to Technology of
the countries of the Andean Pact: Their Foundations, U.N. Doc. TD/107 (1971).
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and development costs involved in the generation of new commercial technology are fixed costs of the enterprise involved. This fixed
cost is recovered by the enterprise when its product is marketed-that is, the product incorporates the technology, and the
technology costs are reflected in the selling price of the product. For
a parent company to sell this technology to its own subsidiary is to
profit twice from the technology: once from the sale of the product
itself, and once from the sale of the technology .135
The ANCOM countries have created legal mechanisms for implementing their policy relating to technology transfer in the Andean Code and in the recently enacted Decisions 84 and 85 of the
Andean Commission. 136 The Andean Code provides broad rules on
several aspects of the technology transfer (or "commercialization")
process, and Decisions 84 and 85 supplement the Code with detailed
provisions relating both to the creation of a regional technological
infrastructure and to the legal treatment of patents, licenses, and
trademarks within ANCOM.
The Andean Code provides that technological agreements may
not be capitalized as foreign direct investments. 137 In addition, parent companies or their affiliates are prohibited from receiving royalty payments from their subsidiaries incorporated in ANCOM
countries for the use of patents, trademarks, licenses, and in some
cases, even technical assistance in the form of personnel. 1311 All
135. Id.
136. Decision 84 of the Andean Commission, Decision on The Bases for a Subregional
Technological Policy, and Decision 85, Decision on Industrial Property, were adopted in June
1974. For the text of these two decisions see 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1478-99 (1974). The
AN COM governments were given a period of six months following the approval of the Decisions to incorporate them into domestic law. Implementing legislation is not yet available,
and it is not yet reported that the Decisions have been implemented. It is possible, of course,
that these new Decisions may be modified somewhat in their implementation in the individual member countries. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this discussion we will treat these
Decisions as if adopted in total.
137. Decision 24, arts. 1 & 21, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126, 128, 134 (1972). This, of course,
means that technology capital cannot be used to increase the right to profit remittances, or
be included in valuation calculation for the purposes.of re-export of capital. See Section III.D.
of the text.
138. Decision 24, art. 21, id. at 134. While the Code prohibits royalty payments for
"intangible technological contribution," this term is not expressly defined in the main body
of the Code. Intangible technological contributions are referred to in Annex 1 of the Code as:
"Marks, Industrial Models, Managerial Capacity, Technical Knowhow Whether or Not Patented, and Alternate Possible Technologies." In Venezuela's implementing Decree 63, technological contributions are expressly defined for Article 21 purposes to include technical
assistance in the form of qualified personnel. Decree 63, art. 6, 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1221,
1222 (1974).
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technological agreements, whether between parent and subsidiary,
or between an ANCOM incorporated firm and unrelated foreign
firm, must be approved by the competent authority of the receiving
member country .139
Patent and trademark licensing agreements are prohibited
from incorporating a variety of restrictive clauses which might tend
to limit the flexibility of the receiving AN COM company in the use
of the license (for example, export restricting clauses, tie-in clauses,
and the like). 140 The recent Decisions 84 and 85 of the Andean Commission, however, establish in detail the guidelines for the registration and authorization of patents, trademarks, and licenses within
ANCOM, and the uniform legal treatment which such registration
will confer. 141
Decision 85 provides regulations for the registration of patents
in the receiving ANCOM country and delineates the legal rights
which ownership of a patent may confer. Patents may not be
granted for certain types of products. 142 The application for a patent
must include a technical description of the invention complete
enough to allow duplication. 143 Patents may be granted for a maximum period of ten years, with renewal and proof of exploitation
required after five years. 144 Subject to the limitations expressed in
other areas of Decision 85, a patent confers on the owner the exclusive right to exploit it in the recipient country, to grant licenses for
its exploitation, and to receive royalties or compensation for its
exploitation. Patents do not confer an exclusive right to import the
patented product or one manufactured under the patented process.145 Filing a patent application in one ANCOM country gives the
applicant a (one-year) priority right to file for patent in the other
member countries. 146
The more interesting regulations of Decision 85 have to do with
the licensing of patents. Patents may only be exploited in ANCOM
139. Decision 24, art. 18, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 126, 132 (1972).
140. Article 20 for clauses which may not be contained in contract on the transfer of
techniques or patents and Article 25 for clauses which may not be contained in trademark
licensing agreements. Decision 24, arts. 20 & 25, id. at 133, 135.
141. Decision 84 deals primarily with the establishment of a regional technology policy.
Legal details are contained in Decision 85. See note 136 supra.
142. This includes, inter alia, pharmaceutical products and beverages. Decision 85, art.
5, 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1489, 1490 (1974).
143. Decision 85, art. 12(e), id. at 1491.
144. Decision 85, art. 29, id. at 1492.
145. Decision 85, art. 28, id.
146. Decision 85, art. 10, id. at 1491.
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pursuant to authorization by competent national authorities. 147 Licensed patents must be exploited within the country of registration
according to conditions established in Decision 85. 1411 After a period
of three years from the date that the patent is granted, any person
may apply to the competent authority for the granting of a "compulsory license" if the patent has not been exploited adequately
within the member country. After a period of five years the competent authority may grant a compulsory license regardless of whether
or not conditions of exploitation have been satisfied. 149 The holder
of a compulsory license must pay an "adequate compensation" to a
patent holder. 150 The government of the country in which the patent
is registered may at any time grant a compulsory license in view of
national development needs or interest in the public · health. m Licenses which do not comply with the regulations established in Decision 85 will be considered void. 152
Trademarks must be approved and registered by the competent
national authority as well, 153 and registration of a trademark grants
the right of exclusive use for continuously renewable periods of five
years. 154 Likewise, trademark licensing agreements must be approved and registered. 155 Trademark licensing agreements may not
include a variety of export-restrictive clauses, which were earlier
prohibited by Article 25 of the Andean Code. 156 Trademarks are not
subject to "compulsory licensing" as are patents.
The new ANCOM regulations governing patents, licensing, and
trademarks represent an attempt by the member countries to make
modern technology more freely accessible to commercial enterprises
in the region. The regulations provided by Decision 85 represent a
radical departure from the traditional concept that patent ownership rights should be afforded the highest degree of protection. In
effect, the patent licensing rules provided by Decision 85 mean that
147. Decision 85, arts. 32, 42, & 43, id. at 1493, 1494.
148. The exploitation of a patent may not be suspended for more than one year; produc tion of the patented product must meet the demands of the national market re quality,
quantity, and price; and the patent owner must grant licenses under reasonable conditions
to satisfy the market. Decision 85, art. 34, id. at 1493.
149. Decision 85, art. 34, id .
150. Decision 85, art. 34, id.
151. Decision 85, art. 39, id. at 1494.
152. Decision 85, art. 40, id.
153. Decision 85, art. 60, id. at 1497.
154. Decision 85, art. 69, id.
155. Decision 85, art. 81, id. at 1498.
156. Decision 85, art. 81, id.
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ANCOM country governments are free to give away a registered
patent to any enterprise which desires it, so long as this procedure
is considered in the interests of the member countries' development
plans, and so long as some unspecified form of compensation is
provided to the patent owner. The rules do not specify that "compulsory licenses" may be issued solely to ANCOM national investors, and it appears that a foreign investor's registered patents may
even be licensed to other foreign enterprises in ANCOM.
Decision 85 was designed to be implemented in the domestic
law of the ANCOM members within six months following its approval by the Commission. 157 No information has yet been made
available on the process of implementation and, as was the case
with the Andean Code, the time limit on implementation may be
exceeded by the member countries. However, when the Decision is
implemented its rules will apply to patents, licenses, and trademarks already registered in the region. 158 In addition, the rule established in Article 21 of the Andean Code which provides that subsidiaries may not pay royalties to their parent companies is already
being enforced in at least some of the member countries; 159 and while
technology supply costs may to some extent be added to the selling
price of products and thereby returned as profit, these profits are
limited to 14 percent per annum on the registered value of the
investment (which cannot include technology).
The impact of the new technology transfer regulations on foreign direct investor behavior can only be speculated upon, as they
have no precedent in modern investment regulation. It might be
expected that for foreign firms whose research and development
costs are high (for whom innovative technology represents a primary
competitive advantage over their international rivals), the ANCOM
technology regulations will represent a major disincentive to new
investment. Or, at least, these firms may wait a period of several
years after the development of a new technology before bringing it
into the Andean region. For firms whose products embody technology which is widely dispersed and whose investment advantages lay
more in the access to capital, marketing, or managerial skills, the
157. Decision 85, art. 86, id. at 1499.
158. Decision 85, art . 85, id.
159. Venezuela, for example, has indicated to foreign direct investors that as of Decem ber 31, 1975, their technology agreements must conform to Decree 63 regulations, one of
which, Article 21, prohibits the payment of subsidiary to parent royalties . Foreign firms have
been informed that after December 31, 1975, they will no longer be permitted royalties to their
parents.
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technology regulations should have little impact at all.
The ANCOM countries are betting that foreign investors will
be willing to trade their technology for access to the expanded
ANCOM market. The outcome of this gamble remains to be seen.
If successful, the ANCOM policy may improve their technological
infrastructure and increase their industrial self-sufficiency. If unsuccessful, the result may be another period of years in which
AN COM industries fall farther behind those of the developed countries in technological development. It remains to be seen how far the
ANCOM countries can proceed in extracting concessions from foreign direct investors before disincentives overshadow opportunities.

IV.
A.

THE INTEGRATION OF MARKETS AS APPLIED TO
THE ANDEAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT CODE
Changing the Economic Balance of Power

In the second section of this Article the relationship between
host developing countries and foreign direct investors was analyzed
in terms of bargaining theory. It was noted that as the economic
power relationship between the two major bargaining participants
changes, the terms by which foreign direct investors are permitted
to operate are also subject to change. The member countries of the
Andean Common Market have taken affirmative action to increase
their economic bargaining power vis-a-vis foreign direct investors.
The movement towards creating a free trade zone among the members and establishing a common customs barrier have, in effect,
created one large economic unit where before there existed an unrelated collection of smaller units. The creation of this integrated
market and the concentration of sovereign authorities in the Andean
Commission have enhanced the economic bargaining power of the
ANCOM countries and have resulted in a change in the terms under
which foreign direct investors are permitted to operate.
As of 1973 the combined population of the ANCOM countries
was 71.6 million persons. By 1980 this figure is expected to reach
more than 90 million. 160 Thus, measured in terms of population, the
ANCOM market is now larger than that of either Argentina or Mexico, and is second only to Brazil among the Latin American countries.161 In addition to a large consumer market, the ANCOM coun160. See How Latin America 's Markets Measure Up ,
1974, at 411.
161. Id.
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tries collectively offer to foreign direct investors a wide range of
natural resources vital to manufacturing activities, for example,
Venezuelan iron and petroleum, Bali vian tin, and Chilean copper,
and a large manpower pool, not as yet fully tapped.
Of course, for a common market to be an attractive market
there must be some indication that the reduction of tariff barriers
will result in an increase in intra-regional trade. Recently released
IMF Direction of Trade statistics 162 provide empirical evidence that
tariff reductions in the ANCOM region are producing an increase
in intra-regional trading activity.
Intra-ANCOM Exports (f.o.b.)
and Imports (c.i.f.)
(Millions of $U.S .)
1968
Exports Imports

-

1973
Exports Imports

Bolivia
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru

3.7
15.0
24.0
12 .3
23 .1

4.6
49 .3
22.0
17.3
28.2

24.2
23.4
79.1
75.4
45.2

8.0
59.4
41.7
32.4
90.7

Venezuela
Total

64.6
142.7

19.7
141.1

51.4
298.7

23.1
255.3

% increase
1968-1973
Exports Imports

554
56
230
513
96

74
20
90
87
222

Ancom % of
total exports
1968
1973

2.2
1.6
4.3
6.3
2.7
<0.5
-20
17
108
81
2.5
Total excluding Venezuela

10.7
1.9
7.3
13.8
4.3
<0.5
4.1
6.0

If Venezuela is excluded from the figures above, because the tremendous rise in petroleum prices actually decreased its share of
intra-ANCOM exports, the figures for the remaining five ANCOM
countries show an increase in intra-regional trading of 217 percent
between 1968 (the year before ANCOM was formed), and 1973.
While the base from which these countries began is not great, 163 the
increase may well be indicative of a trend towards the satisfaction
of ANCOM demands with locally produced product.s.
As a general proposition the ANCOM countries, like all of the
Latin American countries, are at an intermediate stage of industrial
development. 164 At this stage, in order to maintain a competitive
import-substituting and export-producing manufacturing sector,
162. IMF, Direction of Trade, Statistics Bureau, reprinted in Andean Trade Expansion
is Spurred on by Integration Efforts, BusINESS LATIN AMERICA, May 21, 1975, at 163.
163. That is, intra-ANCOM trade as a percentage of exports rose from a 1968 base of
2.5 percent, to a 6.0 percent total in 1973.
164. See U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America, Report of May 1975, at 1; A.
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 96, at 8.
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the ANCOM countries must to some extent depend on foreign capital and technological expertise. At present, Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Chile are more dependent on foreign assistance than are Colombia,
Peru, and Venezuela. The collective attitude of the ANCOM countries towards the contribution of foreign direct investment in the
development process can be more readily identified-although certainly the range of positions between Chile and Peru may be considerably different. This attitude is that foreign direct investment has
both positive and negative attributes, and while the positive contributing factors may be encouraged, the negative attributes-such
as a tendency towards political intervention-cannot be allowed to
predominate. Individual investment projects must be examined
carefully to determine the contribution which may be afforded to
the development process and must be accepted only on the basis of
positive contribution.
The AN COM countries retain the bargaining advantage of sovereign authority, and with this authority at least partially concentrated by the Andean Commission, their power has been enhanced.
That is, foreign governments and investors are no longer confronted
by a single and relatively small Latin American country when they
attempt to influence or object to a decision which an ANCOM government has made. Parties attempting to bargain with the ANCOM
countries are now confronted with a sovereign unit whose territorial
mass extends the entire western length of Latin America. While this
enhancement of sovereign power cannot be measured in statistical
terms, the U.S. Government, for 'example, would more likely sooner
take an action which might alienate a single state like Bolivia than
one which might alienate the entire Andean group.
The economic bargaining power of foreign direct investors is
limited by the lack of concentrated authority. While the AN COM
governments may present a united front to foreign investors, these
investors remain in competition with each other in the international
arena and, in the case of U.S. investors at least, may be prohibited
by antitrust laws from agreeing with unanimity to a set of minimum
investment terms from the ANCOM countries. And even if U.S.
investors could agree to form a united bargaining position vis-a-vis
the ANCOM countries, their competitors from Japan and Western
Europe would remain independently able to fill an investment vacuum. A policy of confrontation might be successful if cooperation
could be established among the direct investment suppliers of all
the developed countries. This policy, however, would be both im-
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practical and counterproductive. 165
In addition, the greater the incentives for investment offered by
a particular region, the more likely that foreign direct investors
would be willing to accept less attractive investment terms. Thus,
whichever factors explain the motivation behind a foreign investor's
decision to enter a particular region, 166 the increase in AN COM
market size and the trend towards increased intra-regional trade are
bound to represent positive investment incentives. The increased
economies of scale which foreign direct investors are permitted and
the protection which a common tariff barrier may afford will increase the competitive advantage of the local producer. Transnational competitors are not likely to risk losing a market as large as
ANCOM to their rivals.
B.

The ANCOM Bargaining Strategy

Within the limits of the economic balance of power, host countries and foreign direct investors may employ bargaining strategy to
obtain for themselves the most attractive set of investment conditions that are mutually acceptable. The bargaining strategy of the
ANCOM countries has taken the form of the Andean Foreign Investment Code. The Andean Code establishes for all of the member
countries a set of minimum non-negotiable bargaining principles
which the members are prohibited from relaxing. The commitments
of the member countries are enforced by public opinion, domestic
law, and the sanctioning powers of their ANCOM neighbors. 167
The major commitments of the ANCOM countries include the
gradual divestment of majority ownership and control in nonexempted sectors, the adherence to strict requirements for agreements on the transfer of technology, and, to a great degree, the
limitation of the remittance of profits abroad. 168 Because these
major principles are non-negotiable, they place the foreign direct
investor in a position of either investing and accepting the terms
offered, or rejecting these terms and refraining from entering
AN COM.
165. That is, a united demand by the Western developed investment suppliers for a
change in the terms of the Andean Code would probably cause political problems which would
more than outweigh the benefits of improved investment terms.
166. See Section 11.A.2 of the text.
167. The most powerful evidence that this sanctioning power is effective is that Chile
was forced to back down from a different set of principles which it established in contravention of the Code. See note 90 supra.
168. Exemption from this requirement requires petitioning the Andean Commission. See
text accompanying note 105 supra.
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On the other hand, the Andean Code by no means eliminates
all bargaining between individual ANCOM governments and potential foreign direct investors. The valuation of the foreign direct investment (on which much of the potential for an investment's profitability depends) has been left to the discretion of the individual
member governments. In addition, the levels of income taxation and
capital re-export taxation, as well as the ability to petition the Commission for a change in profit remittance levels, have been left in
the hands of individual member governments. Therefore, for foreign
direct investors who are willing to accept the major requirements of
the Andean Code, there remains a flexibility within which a relatively attractive investment agreement can be negotiated.
The increase in ANCOM's economic power vis-a-vis foreign
direct investors and the strategy of commitment to several major
investment regulating principles are designed to produce a major
change in the role which foreign direct investors play in the political,
social, and economic life of the ANCOM countries. For the desired
changes to be achieved, the ANCOM countries must maintain a
firm commitment to these principles, because once negotiation over
the major principles of the Andean Code is permitted, the ability
of the member countries to maintain them will be severely diminished.
C.

The Outcome of the ANCOM Strategy

We cannot judge the impact of the Code on the basis of whether
the flow of foreign direct investment into ANCOM has increased,
diminished, or remained the same because the ANCOM countries
clearly had goals in mind other than maintaining a steady flow of
foreign direct investment when adopting the Code. How can we
measure the political, economic, and social value of increased participation of local investors in the industrial development plans and
future of a region?
The U.S. Department of Commerce statistics on the book value
of U.S. direct manufacturing investments in ANCOM and other
Latin American countries supply little in the way of revealing analysis. '69
169. These statistics are compiled from the Department of Commerce publication
Survey of Current Business, for the years 1968-1974.
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Estimates of Property, Plant and Equipment
Expenditures by Majority-Owned Foreign Affiliates
of U.S . Companies - Manufacturing Totals (Millions of $U .S.)
1966
Chile

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

---

·-

1974
~-

Total
1966 1975

1975
-

8

11

13

18

10

3

1

1

3

Colombia

20

24

22

25

34

39

49

51

49

Peru

28

42

31

15

7

8

6

6

6

Venezuela
Other and
Unallocated
Mexico
Panama
Other Central
America
Argentina
Brazil

37

44

45

62

55

59

56

85

79

7
100
1

6
105
2

7
177
2

13
155
4

6
168
3

6
142
4

7
157
6

10
180
8

24
213
10

23
254
10

100
1

254
10

13
60
91

15
73
142

19
64
200

23
95
206

26
124
189..

26
90
295

23
59
461

28
89
563

35
95
645

44
106
1040

60
91

106
1040

9)
)

58) ANCOM total
) excluding
11) Ecuador &
) Bolivia
107)
185
93

I

-

In the five year period between 1968 (two years before the Andean Code was adopted) and 1973, the increase in the book value
of U.S. manufacturing investments in the ANCOM countries as a
whole (excluding Bolivia and Ecuador) was considerably greater
than that for Argentina, slightly less than the increase for Mexico,
and considerably less than the increase for Brazil. Chile, where the
value of U.S. manufacturing investment actually decreased during
this five year period, experienced severe political disruptions during
this period, so that the decline in foreign direct investment activity
can hardly be attributed solely to the Andean Code. Peru, where the
value of U.S. manufacturing investment remained nearly constant,
pursued a policy towards foreign direct investors which went beyond
the requirements of the Andean Code.
The Department of Commerce estimates on property, plant,
and equipment expenditures by U.S. manufacturers, which are
more current, tell much the same story .170 Again we find that
ANCOM as a whole was the site of expenditure increases slightly
higher than in Argentina, slightly lower than in Mexico, and with
other Latin American countries lagging far behind Brazil. Again,
the lack of dynamism in Chile and Peru must be attributed to
domestic political activities as much as to the Andean Code.
What conclusions can we draw from these statistics? First, it
appears that Brazil is far more attractive to foreign direct investors
170. See BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT
BUSINESS, Sept. 1974, at 23-34, Mar. 1975, at 19-23.
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Estimates of Property, Plant and Equipment
Expenditures by Majority-Owned Foreign Affiliates
of U .S. Companies-Manufacturing Totals (Millions of $U.S.)

1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1966 1975
Chile
Colombia
Peru

-8- 11
20
24
28
42

Venezuela
37
Other and
7
Unallocated
Mexico
100
Panama
1
Other Central
13
American
Argentina
60
Brazil
91

~----rs - ~~-

9) - ANCOM58) totals

22
31

25
15

34
7

39
8

1
49
6

1
51
6

3
49
6

44

45

62

55

59

56

85

79

107)

93

6
105
2

7
177
2

13
155
4

6
168
3

6
142
4

7
157
6

10
180
8

24
213
10

23
254
10

-

-

100
1

254
10

15
73
142

19
64
200

23
95
206

26
124
189

26
90
295

23
59
461

28
89
463

35
95
645

44
106
1040

-

-

11)

excluding
Ecuador &
Bolivia

185

60 106
91 1040

than other Latin American countries. Brazil offers the largest consumer market in Latin America in terms of population, an unusual
history of political stability, and a governmental attitude which is
hospitable to foreign direct investment. 171 Beyond this, the ANCOM
countries as a unit have attracted slightly more foreign direct investment than Argentina and slightly less than Mexico in the period
since the Andean Code was adopted. Argentina and Mexico have
adopted foreign investment regulations somewhat similar to those
of the ANCOM countries. 172
But as has already been indicated, the measure of success or
failure of the AN COM policy towards foreign direct investment will
depend on the future of economic development in ANCOM, the
increase in political, economic, and social autonomy, and the creation of a technological infrastructure which is capable of meeting
the challenges of the developed world. It may well be 20 years before
the results are clear.
D.

Implications and Conclusion

A great tension presently surrounds the relationship between
developing countries and foreign direct investors throughout the
world. Governments feel themselves threatened by what they perceive as the overwhelming power of transnational enterprises to influence their economies and destinies. Transnational enterprises
consider themselves threatened by what they consider a disregard
on the part of sovereign governments for their legal rights.
171. For a thorough discussion of investment conditions in Brazil, see generally P. GARLAND, 0otNG BUSINESS IN AND WITH BRAZIL (1972) .
172. For Argentina, see 12 lNT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1489 (1973). For Mexico, see id. at 643.
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The member countries of the Andean Common Market have
taken innovative steps towards achieving a balance between their
own interests and the interests of foreign direct investors. They have
integrated their economies, and to some extent their sovereign authorities, in order to increase their economic power vis-a-vis foreign
direct investors, and they have adopted and implemented the Andean Foreign Investment Code to take advantage of the new economic balance.
The continuous bargaining process which characterizes the relationship between host countries and foreign direct investors indicates that investment agreements are subject to renegotiation and
change. The Andean Foreign Investment Code provides a legal
mechanism to accomplish this change over time by requiring foreign
investors gradually to relinquish their control over manufacturing
enterprises. The Code thus provides a mechanism for reducing
the political tensions surrounding the presence of transnational subsidiaries by eliminating the necessity for abrupt demands or expropriations by the ANCOM countries. It also embodies a degree of
flexibility which permits both governments and investors to seek
and make concessions on the terms of investment agreements.
The ANCOM model of integration and investment regulation
may well be the wave of the future. Unless the international community as a whole can prescribe guidelines for the operations of
transnational enterprises, it remains for individual countries and
regions to deal with the issues surrounding them on their own. In
this Article an attempt has been made to characterize the relationship between host countries and foreign direct investors and to show
how the actions of governments can affect this relationship. Legal
systems cannot be divorced from the realities which they govern,
and if systems are to be developed which can reduce the tensions
surrounding foreign direct investment, the factors which govern investment conditions must first be understood.
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